Tag Archives: Substance

Monads as Functions

How does a Leibnizian monad (which, viewed as active, or as clearly and distinctly perceiving, possesses substantial form, and which, viewed as passive, or as obscurely and confusedly perceiving, possesses prime matter) relate to its body? The monad/body distinction maps onto … Continue reading

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Criticizing Aristotle on “substance”

Here’s a simplified criticism of the Aristotelian theory of substance. For Aristotle, a substance has three components: matter, form, and accidents, each playing a different explanatory role. Consider a tree. It’s one thing, but also a member of a particular natural … Continue reading

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Spinoza, Platonist?

Spinoza notoriously argues that there is only (and could only be) one substance (Ethics 1p14), “God or nature” (1p29s) and everything else, including human persons, is just a “modification” of the attributes of God (2p10). But he has a very high bar for … Continue reading

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Buddhist skepticism

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan argues that one unifying conviction of the six Brahmanical darsanas, the “orthodox systems” of classical Hindu thought, was an opposition to “the skepticism of the Buddhists” (Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, 354). What does that mean, exactly? Well, consider this … Continue reading

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