Category Archives: Inference

Intension vs. Extension in the “Theatetus”

Plato’s Theaetetus really gets going when Socrates asks Theatetus to define knowledge (145e), and Theaetetus answers with a list: whatever you can learn from Theodorus (Theaetetus’s teacher), or (perhaps implicitly) another expert: disciplines such as geometry, and crafts such as cobbling. Socrates then … Continue reading

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Perception and Concepts in Brandom’s “Articulating Reasons”

From Wilfrid Sellars and from Hegel (“Sense Certainty” in the Phenomenology), Brandom suggests, we learn “that even such noninferential reports [as color perceptions] must be inferentially articulated” (48, and cf. my discussion of roughly the same point in McDowell). “Without that … Continue reading

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Forks in Robert Brandom’s Road

Robert Brandom opens his little book Articulating Reasons (which stands to the massive Making It Explicit roughly as Hume’s Inquiry stands to his Treatise) by observing, “This is a book about the use and content of concepts. Its animating thought is that the meanings of linguistic expressions … Continue reading

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The Logician’s Pyrrhic Victory

From Newman’s Grammar of Assent: Logical inference…will be found partly to succeed and partly to fail; succeeding so far as words can in fact be found for representing the countless varieties and subtleties of human thought, failing on account of the … Continue reading

Posted in Grammar of Assent, Inference, John Henry Newman, John O'Callaghan, Newman, Notions and Things, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn | Tagged , , , , , , , | 2 Comments